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PROTECTING PERSONAL DATA: 
A MODEL DATA SECURITY AND  
BREACH NOTIFICATION STATUTE 
MICHAEL BLOOM† 
INTRODUCTION 
Equifax is one of the three major consumer credit reporting 
agencies in the United States.1  On July 29, 2017, Equifax 
discovered that hackers had breached its security and potentially 
compromised the sensitive information of 143 million American 
consumers, including Social Security numbers and driver’s 
license numbers.2  Hackers also gained access to names, birth 
dates and addresses, as well as credit card numbers for 209,000 
consumers.3  A fraud analyst stated that “[o]n a scale of 1 to 10 in 
terms of risk to consumers, this is a 10.”4  Another commentator 
stated that “[i]t is no exaggeration to suggest that a breach such 
as this—exposing highly sensitive personal and financial 
information central for identity management and access to 
credit—represents a real threat to the economic security of 
Americans.”5  This was not the first time that consumer data 
stored by Equifax was accessed and acquired by hackers.  In 
2016, hackers breached W-2 tax and salary data from an Equifax 
website, and in 2017, W-2 tax data from an Equifax subsidiary 
was stolen.6  Identity thieves can use this stolen data to 
“impersonate people with lenders, creditors and service 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2019, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., 2014, St. John’s University. The Author would like 
to extend his gratitude to the members and editors of the St. John’s Law Review for 
their dedication and immense effort throughout the publication process. He would 
also like to thank his family for their support and encouragement.    
1 Tara Siegel Bernard et al., Equifax Attack Exposes Data of 143 Million, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2017, at A1. 
2 Id.; WADE BAKER ET AL., VERIZON, 2011 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS 
REPORT 31 (2011), https://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-
breach-investigations-report-2011_en_xg.pdf (defining hacking as “attempts to 
intentionally access or harm information assets without . . . authorization by 
thwarting logical security mechanisms”). 
3 Bernard et al., supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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providers, who rely on personal identity information from 
Equifax to make financial decisions regarding potential 
customers.”7 
Equifax is far from being the only large corporation to have 
substantial amounts of its customers’ sensitive information 
compromised.  For example, in 2013, a massive hack affected 
three billion Yahoo accounts.8  Yahoo did not disclose the breach 
to the public until September 2016, stating that data associated 
with at least 500 million accounts had been stolen.9  In mid-
December 2016, Yahoo disclosed a separate security breach that 
also dated back to 2013.10  It was not until October 2017 that 
Yahoo finally disclosed that this second 2013 hack affected all 
three billion user accounts that existed at the time of the breach, 
thus “cement[ing] Yahoo’s place at the top of a long and 
ignominious list of massive security breaches.”11 
Consumers have been plagued by other high profile data 
breaches, including hacks of: (1) Sony Online Entertainment 
consumer information of 102 million video game customers, such 
as names, addresses, emails, birth dates, and phone numbers of 
users;12 (2) a database from Anthem, one of the nation’s largest 
health insurers, containing eighty million records of current and 
former customers including names, Social Security numbers, 
birth dates, addresses, email and employment information, and 
income data;13 (3) email addresses and account details for thirty-
two million members of the site Ashley Madison, an  
 
 
7 Id. 
8 Jethro Mullen & Seth Fiegerman, Yahoo Tops the List of Largest Ever Data 
Breaches, CNN TECH (Oct. 4, 2017, 5:20 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/04/technology/yahoo-biggest-data-breaches-
ever/index.html. 
9 Seth Fiegerman, Yahoo Says 500 Million Accounts Stolen, CNN TECH (Sept. 
23, 2016, 10:39 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/22/technology/yahoo-data-
breach/?iid=EL. 
10 Seth Fiegerman, Yahoo Says Data Stolen from 1 Billion Accounts, CNN TECH 
(Dec. 15, 2016, 4:30 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-breach-
billion-users/index.html?iid=EL. 
11 Mullen & Fiegerman, supra note 8. 
12 Charles Arthur, Sony Suffers Second Data Breach with Theft of 25m More 
User Details, THE GUARDIAN (May 3, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/tech 
nology/blog/2011/may/03/sony-data-breach-online-entertainment. 
13 Reed Abelson & Matthew Goldstein, Hackers Breached Data of Millions, 
Insurer Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015, at B1. 
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“extramarital affairs website”;14 and (4) Target, which confirmed 
on December 19, 2013, that credit and debit card information for 
about forty million customers had been stolen.15 
The illegal acquisition of consumer information on such a 
wide scale can have major impacts on consumers.16  Generally, 
consumers can only protect themselves from the potential 
consequences of these hacks if they are promptly notified that 
they have occurred.  All fifty states require corporations to 
comply with certain data security standards.  For example, states 
require that companies take certain steps to notify consumers in 
the event that certain types of their stored data are accessed 
without authorization.17  However, there is no federal statute 
addressing the issue.  The lack of a unified standard, as well as 
the absence of certain forms of protections in these state statutes, 
subject consumers to a greater risk of loss of their personal data’s 
integrity than is necessary.  In 2015, President Obama called on 
Congress in his State of the Union address to pass cybersecurity 
legislation because “we need to better meet the evolving threat of 
cyber attacks, combat identity theft, and protect our children’s 
information.”18  Several bills have been proposed in the last 
several years, including the Data Security and Breach 
Notification Act of 2015 (the “DSBNA” or “Act”).  The bill was 
sent to a Senate Committee twice, but never came to a vote and 
was never ratified.  The DSBNA sought to preempt the various 
state laws on data breach notification in order to create a federal 
standard for how and when corporations should notify consumers 
in the event their data was accessed.  It also dictated the extent 
 
14 Robert Hackett, What To Know About the Ashley Madison Hack, FORTUNE 
(Aug. 26, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/26/ashley-madison-hack/. 
15 Rachel Abrams, Target To Pay $18.5 Million to 47 States in Security Breach 
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/ 
business/target-security-breach-settlement.html. 
16 One vulnerability expert described the Equifax breach as “a Category 5 
hurricane in the cyberworld,” whose “lasting impact . . . will go on for years.” Andrew 
Soergel, Equifax Breach Could Have ‘Decades of Impact’, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2017-09-08/equifax-breach-
could-have-decades-of-impact-on-consumers. 
17 Data Breach Notification Laws: Now in All 50 States, PRIVACY RTS. 
CLEARINGHOUSE (May 9, 2018), https://privacyrights.org/blog/data-breach-
notification-laws-now-all-50-states. 
18 Barack Obama, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 
2015). See also Drew Amorosi, Obama Wants Federal Data Breach Notification Law, 
DATACENTER DYNAMICS (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.datacenterdynamics.com/content-
tracks/security-risk/obama-wants-federal-data-breach-notification-
law/93420.fullarticle. 
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of liability for failing to comply with the DSBNA’s mandates.  
While the Act ultimately did not pass, it provides a framework, 
along with state notification laws, that this Note will use to set 
forth its arguments. 
This Note argues that current law is inadequate to protect 
consumers in light of the prevalence and severity of data 
breaches in recent years, and that a unifying federal legislation 
combining portions of state law and the DSBNA should be 
enacted.  Part I of this Note analyzes the DSBNA for notification 
requirements when data breaches occur, the requirements for the 
implementation of security policies, regulatory mechanisms for 
monitoring compliance with these requirements, and criminal 
penalties for failing to comply.  Part II summarizes the various 
state laws that exist for notification of data breaches.  Part III 
proposes a model federal statute that combines aspects of the 
DSBNA with current state law.  Specifically, Part III argues that 
a preemption provision is important for creating a unified federal 
standard, but that provision should create exceptions for robust 
protections that consumers already enjoy under state law.  It also 
argues for the inclusion of a private right of action for consumers, 
the removal of a reasonable risk of harm analysis, and a 
provision that mandates cyber risk insurance for certain covered 
entities. 
I. THE DATA SECURITY AND BREACH NOTIFICATION ACT OF 2015 
The stated purpose of the DSBNA is “to provide for 
nationwide notice in the event of a breach of security” and “[t]o 
protect consumers by requiring reasonable security policies and 
procedures to protect data concerning personal information.”19  
The DSBNA requires the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to 
promulgate regulations requiring commercial entities to 
implement information security policies and procedures for the 
treatment of personal information.20  It also sets out procedures 
that must be complied with in the event of a data breach.21  
Overall, the DSBNA goes too far in weakening consumer 
protection that already exists for the sake of promoting unity.  
This Part analyzes certain relevant provisions of the Act, 
addressing: (1) the definitions of personal data; (2) when and in 
 
19 See generally Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015, S. 177, 
114th Cong. (2015). 
20 Id. § 2(a)(1). 
21 See infra Parts I.B and I.C. 
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what form notification is required to affected individuals, law 
enforcement, and third parties; (3) the reasonable risk of harm 
exemption for notification; (4) preemption; and (5) penalties for 
noncompliance. 
A. Definitions of Important Terms in the DSBNA 
The Act defines a data breach as a compromise of the 
security or confidentiality of electronic data that results in—or 
could reasonably be concluded to have resulted in—unauthorized 
access to or acquisition of personal information from a covered 
entity.22  Covered entities include “sole proprietorship[s], 
partnership[s], corporation[s], trust[s], estate[s], cooperative[s], 
association[s], or other commercial entit[ies], and any charitable, 
educational, or nonprofit organization, that acquires, maintains, 
or utilizes personal information.”23 
Personal information is defined more broadly in the DSBNA 
than it is in many, but not all, state statutes.24  Under the 
DSBNA, personal information includes: (1) a non-truncated 
social security number; (2) a financial account number or credit 
or debit card number in combination with any security code, 
access code, or password that is required for an individual to 
obtain credit, withdraw funds, or engage in a financial 
transaction; or (3) an individual’s first and last name or first 
initial and last name in combination with (a) a driver’s license 
number, a passport number, an alien registration number, or 
other similar number on a government document used to verify 
identity, (b) unique biometric data such as a fingerprint or voice 
print, (c) a unique account identifier, electronic identification 
number, user name, or routing code, in combination with an 
access code or password, (d) or any two of the following: home 
address or telephone number, mother’s maiden name, or month, 
day, and year of birth.25  This broad definition offers strong 
protections for consumers and triggers the notification 
requirements more readily than the state statutes with more 
restrictive definitions.26 
 
22 S. 177 § 6(1)(A). 
23 Id. § 6(3). 
24 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
25 S. 177 § 6(9). 
26 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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B. Notification to Individuals and Law Enforcement 
When a covered entity—an entity that owns or possesses 
electronic data containing personal information—discovers a 
breach of the security system containing that data, it must notify 
several individuals and entities.27  First, the entity must notify 
each individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States 
and whose personal information is reasonably believed to have 
been acquired as a result of the breach.28 
Such notification shall be made within thirty days after the 
date of discovery of a breach or: 
as promptly as possible if the covered entity providing notice 
can show that providing notice within [thirty days] is not 
feasible due to circumstances necessary (A) to accurately 
identify affected consumers; (B) to prevent further breach or 
unauthorized disclosures; or (C) to reasonably restore the 
integrity of the data system.29 
The covered entity can provide notification in three ways: 
(1) in writing; (2) by email if the entity’s primary means of 
communication with an individual is by email or if the individual 
has consented to receive communications by email; or (3) by any 
means that can be reasonably expected to reach the individual.30 
The notification must include several points of information to 
comply with the requirements of the DSBNA.  This includes: 
(1) the date of the security breach; (2) a description of the 
personal information that has been or is reasonably believed to 
have been breached; (3) a telephone number that the customer 
can use to contact the entity and inquire about the breach; 
(4) notice that the individual may be entitled to consumer credit 
reports under another section of the Act; (5) instructions on how 
to receive those credit reports; (6) a telephone number and 
address to contact each major credit reporting agency; and 
finally, (7) a telephone number and a website to obtain 
information regarding identity theft from the FTC.31 
Under the DSBNA, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
would be required to designate a federal government entity to 
receive notice.32  A covered entity would be required to notify the 
 
27 S. 177 § 3. 
28 Id. § 3(a)(1). 
29 Id. § 3(c)(1)–(2). 
30 Id. § 3(d)(1)(A). 
31 Id. § 3(d)(1)(B). 
32 Id. § 4(a). 
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designated government agency in several circumstances.  First, if 
the number of consumers whose personal information is 
reasonably believed to have been acquired exceeds ten 
thousand.33  Second, if the breach of security involves a database 
containing the personal information of more than one million 
individuals.34  Third, if the breach involves databases owned by 
the federal government.35  Lastly, an entity must notify the 
designated government agency if the breach of security involves 
primarily personal information of individuals known to the 
covered entity to be employees or contractors of the federal 
government involved in national security or law enforcement.36 
The DSBNA also details what must be included in the notice 
to the designated federal agency.  These requirements are the 
same as the first three requirements of notice to individuals: 
(1) the date of the security breach; (2) a description of the nature 
of the breach of security; and (3) a description of each type of 
information reasonably believed to have been acquired.37  Notice 
must be delivered as soon as possible, but not less than three 
business days before notification to an individual and not later 
than ten days after the date of discovery of the breach.38 
C. Reasonable Risk of Harm Exemption 
Generally, an entity covered by the DSBNA is exempt from 
the above notification requirements if the entity “reasonably 
concludes” following a breach of security that there is no 
reasonable risk of identity theft, fraud, or other unlawful 
conduct.39  The statute in fact provides a presumption that no 
reasonable risk of identity theft, fraud, or other unlawful conduct 
exists following a breach of security if “the data is rendered 
unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable through a security 
technology or methodology,” such as encryption, and this 
technology or methodology is generally accepted by experts in the 
security field.40  This presumption can be rebutted by facts 
demonstrating that the security technology or methodology in a 
 
33 Id. § 4(b)(1). 
34 Id. § 4(b)(2). 
35 Id. § 4(b)(3). 
36 Id. § 4(b)(4). 
37 Id. § 4(c)(1). 
38 Id. § 4(e). 
39 Id. § 3(g)(1). 
40 Id. § 3(g)(2)(A). 
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specific case is reasonably likely to be compromised.41  The 
Commission is to meet within one year after enactment of the Act 
to determine all relevant security technologies and methodologies 
through consultation with relevant industries and consumer 
organizations.42  The Commission is then to determine which 
technologies and methodologies, when in use, comply with the 
dictates of the presumption.43  The rules imply that entities 
should presume a notification requirement, unless this 
presumption is rebutted by a showing that there is no reasonable 
risk of harm to consumers.44 
Arguably, requiring notification even when there has not 
been, or does not appear to be, any risk of actual harm would 
lead to over-notification.45  Over-notification would increase the 
costs to entities by forcing them to comply with broad notification 
requirements, as well as by increasing the intangible costs that 
would be incurred through reputational damage and reduced 
consumer loyalty.46  However, these potential costs will further 
incentivize covered entities to maintain strong cybersecurity 
policies and to keep up with innovations in that industry.  
Preferably, entities would employ policies that limit their 
exposure to potential breaches to the technologically possible 
minimum.  Finding a statutory way of encouraging entities to be 
that thorough, proactive, and consumer-oriented in their 
approach is preferable to a lesser standard that merely lists some 
bare minimum requirements entities must comply with after a 
breach has already occurred. 
D. Penalties and Preemption 
The DSBNA does not provide a private right of action for 
individuals to bring suit to enforce its provisions.  Instead, if the 
attorney general of a state “has reason to believe that an interest 
of the residents of that State has been or is threatened or 
adversely affected by any covered entity who violates” the 
 
41 Id. § 3(g)(2)(B). 
42 Id. § 3(g)(3). 
43 Id. 
44 Patricia Bailin, Examining the President’s Proposed National Data Breach 
Notification Standard Against Existing Legislation, IAPP (Feb. 27, 2015), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/examining-the-presidents-proposed-national-data-breach-
notification-standard-against-existing-legislation/#. 
45 Jacqueline May Tom, Note, A Simple Compromise: The Need for a Federal 
Data Breach Notification Law, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1569, 1577–78 (2010). 
46 Id. at 1571. 
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notification requirements of the DSBNA, he may bring a civil 
action on behalf of the residents of that state.47  The action may 
seek to enjoin further violation by the defendant, compel 
compliance with the DSBNA, or obtain civil penalties.48  
Damages are calculated by multiplying the days of 
noncompliance or the number of violations by an amount not 
greater than $11,000.49  Each failure to notify a resident is 
considered a separate violation of the law.50  The DSBNA caps 
the potential liability a defendant can face at $5,000,000 for each 
violation of a requirement to notify law enforcement and 
$5,000,000 for all violations of the requirements to notify 
individuals.51 
Additionally, an attorney general can bring an action against 
a covered entity for violation of the requirements of notice to law 
enforcement agencies as well.52  In such actions, the burden of 
proof is a preponderance of the evidence; once met, an entity is 
subject to a maximum penalty of $1,000 per individual.53  This 
penalty is capped at $100,000 per day until the violation has 
been remedied.54  The total amount of civil penalties that can be 
imposed in such a situation is $1,000,000, except where the 
infraction was willful or intentional.55  In that case, an additional 
civil penalty of $1,000,000 can be imposed on the violating 
entity.56  An attorney general can also petition a United States 
district court for an order enjoining an entity from engaging in 
any act or practice that appears to violate the notification 
requirements of § 4.57 
The DSBNA also imposes liability on persons who have 
knowledge of a breach of security requiring notification under the 
Act and intentionally and willfully conceal that knowledge, if the  
 
 
 
 
47 S. 177, 114th Cong. § 5(d)(1) (2015). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. § 5(d)(2)(A)(i). 
50 Id. § 5(d)(2)(A)(ii) (“Each failure to send notification . . . to a resident of the 
State shall be treated as a separate violation.”). 
51 Id. § 5(d)(2)(C). 
52 Id. § 5(e)(1). 
53 Id. § 5(e)(2)(A). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. § 5(e)(2)(B). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. § 5(e)(3). 
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breach “results in economic harm to any individual in the 
amount of $1,000 or more.”58  Such persons can be subject to a 
civil fine, imprisonment for up to five years, or both.59 
The most problematic aspect of the DSBNA is that it 
contains a broad preemption provision.  It states that no persons 
other than those specified above may bring a civil action under 
the laws of any state if such action is premised on a violation of 
the Act.60  This means that private individuals cannot bring state 
common law causes of action for the behavior of entities that 
amounts to a violation of the DSBNA.  The Act also supersedes 
“any provision of a statute, regulation, or rule of a State . . . that 
expressly . . . requires notification to individuals of a breach of 
security,” with respect to covered entities under the DSBNA.61  
However, an entity is not exempt from actions sounding in 
common law, such as tort, under the Act.62  As discussed below, 
the protections provided for in state statutes are often more 
consumer-oriented than protections in the DSBNA.63  Analogous 
state laws requiring notification to individuals would no longer 
be effective if the Act was enacted as is.  Enacting a federal 
standard with a preemption provision as broad as the one 
proposed in the DSBNA would have far-reaching consequences 
for consumers, effectively weakening their protection.64 
II. COMPARING STATE DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 
The need for a unified federal standard and what should be 
included in that standard can only be determined by analyzing 
what protections have already been put in place by state law.  As 
such, much like the analysis of the Act above, several categories 
of these laws will be examined in turn: (1) the various definitions 
of personal data; (2) when, in what form, and to whom 
notification is required; (3) the reasonable risk of harm exception; 
and (4) penalties for noncompliance. 
 
58 Id. § 1041(a). 
59 Id. § 1041(a). 
60 Id. § 7(b)(1). 
61 Id. § 7(a)(1). 
62 Id. § 7(c)(1)–(2). 
63 See infra Part III.A. 
64 See infra Part III.A. 
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A. Covered Entities and Definitions of Personal Data 
Generally, under analogous state statutes, entities that 
conduct business in the state and that maintain computerized 
records of personal information are covered.65  Most state 
notification statutes also require the cooperation of service 
providers.66  There are some limited exceptions.  For example, 
Minnesota’s statute does not cover financial institutions, whereas 
the DSBNA does.67  Additionally, Maine carves out an exception 
for governmental agencies that maintain records primarily for 
traffic safety, law enforcement, and licensing purposes.68 
The definitions of personal data also vary across state 
notification statutes.  For example, Colorado’s recently amended 
statute, effective September 1, 2018, defines personal data as a 
“Colorado resident’s first name or first initial and last name in 
combination with any” of the following unencrypted elements: 
(1) social security number; (2) student, military, or passport 
identification number; (3) driver’s license number or 
identification card number; (4) medical information; (5) health 
insurance identification number; (6) or biometric data.69  
Colorado’s definition of personal information also includes an 
account or credit card number in combination with any required 
code that would allow access to the account, or a username or 
email address with a password or security question answer that 
would allow access.70  This definition evinces a movement to 
protect broader categories of personal data.  Most state 
definitions include subsets of what is included in Colorado’s 
amended statute.  The DSBNA is less broad and does not include 
medical history or an individual’s health insurance policy 
number, for example.71  Some states do not include specific 
categories of data like health and medical data but do include 
catch-all terms like “[u]nique electronic identifier,” along with 
the security information necessary to access the account.72  As  
 
 
65 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-552(A) (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-
701b(b)(1) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW. § 14-3504(b)(1) (West 2018). 
66 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(2)(b) (West 2018). 
67 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61(4) (West 2018) (providing an exemption to 
financial institutions). 
68 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1347(3) (2017). 
69 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(1)(g)(I)(A). 
70 Id. § 6-1-716(1)(g)(I)(B)–(C). 
71 S. 177, 114th Cong. § 6(9) (2015). 
72 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.1(11)(a)(4) (West 2018). 
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our notions of what is considered personal data worthy of 
protection and privacy expand, that should be reflected in a 
unified federal statute. 
B. Who, When, and How: Notification Requirements 
State notification statutes vary as far as to whom they 
require notice be given.  As you would expect, every state 
provides that notice must be provided to the affected individual 
when the notification requirement is triggered.73  A significant 
portion of states require that this notice also be given to the state 
attorney general.74  Further, some statutes require notice to 
consumer reporting agencies as well.75 
State law varies as to how long entities have to notify the 
required individuals and entities.  Most states require that notice 
be given “in the most expedient time possible and without 
unreasonable delay.”76  Some states provide upper limits on what 
is expedient and reasonable. 77 
Entities can employ several means to notify individuals of 
data breaches.  In New York, notice can be provided in writing, 
electronically if the person to whom notice is being sent has 
consented, or via telephone.78  If a business in New York 
demonstrates to the attorney general that the cost of notice 
would exceed $250,000, then substitute notice is available.79  
Substitute notice must consist of an email, “[c]onspicuous posting 
of the notice on the website page of the covered entity if the 
covered entity maintains one,” and “[n]otification to major 
 
73 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 3(b) (West 2018); NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 87-803(1) (West 2018); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(2) (McKinney 2018). 
74 E.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.604(1)(b) (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 
§ 2435(b)(3)(C)(i) (West 2018). 
75 E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:20(VI)(a) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 75-65(f) (West 2018). 
76 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61(1)(a) 
(West 2018); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.72(12)(4) (West 2018) (“A person 
or agency shall provide any notice required under this section without unreasonable 
delay.”). 
77 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171(4)(a) (West 2018) (“Notice to individuals shall be 
made as expeditiously as practicable . . . but no later than 30 days.”); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1349.19(B)(2) (West 2018) (provides a forty-five-day time limit to 
provide notice); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435(b)(1) (also provides a forty-five-day time 
limit); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(16) (West 2018) (forty-five-day time 
limit). 
78 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(5)(a)–(c). 
79 Id. § 899-aa(5)(d). Colorado provides the same threshold cost for substitute 
notice availability. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(1)(f)(IV) (West 2018). 
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statewide media.”80  Maine allows for substitute notice if an 
entity demonstrates that the cost of providing notice would 
exceed merely $5,000, if the affected class of individuals exceeds 
one thousand persons, or if the entity does not have sufficient 
contact information to provide written or electronic notice.81 
Some states do not explicitly delineate what must be 
included in a notice given to consumers.  Other states require 
specific pieces of information in the notice and provide guidelines 
on how the language of the notice should be written.  For 
example, Washington provides that the notice of the breach must 
be written in plain language, and include at the minimum: 
(i) The name and contact information of the reporting person or 
business subject to this section; (ii) A list of the types of 
personal information that were or are reasonably believed to 
have been the subject of a breach; and (iii) The toll-free 
telephone numbers and addresses of the major credit reporting 
agencies if the breach exposed personal information.82 
Virginia also provides that the notice must include “[t]he 
general acts of the [business] to protect the personal information 
from further unauthorized access [or acquisition]” and “[a]dvice 
that directs the [consumer] to remain vigilant by reviewing 
account statements and monitoring free credit reports.”83  And 
Colorado requires contact information for the FTC in addition to 
reporting agencies.84 
C. What Triggers Notification 
Similar to the DSBNA, some state laws provide that 
notification is not required if, after an appropriate investigation, 
identity theft or other fraud to any consumer is not reasonably 
likely to occur as a result of a breach.85  New York’s statute lists 
criteria that entities can consult when analyzing the risk of harm 
resulting from a breach, and that courts can consider when 
 
80 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(1)(f)(IV). 
81 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1347(4)(C) (2017). Kansas allows for substitute 
notice when the cost of providing notice will exceed $100,000 or the affected class of 
consumers exceeds five thousand. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01(c)(3) (West 2018). 
82 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(14). 
83 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(A) (West 2018). 
84 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(2)(a.2). 
85 MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.1500(2)(5) (West 2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-
C:20(I)(a) (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163(a) (West 2018). 
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determining if an entity’s conclusion was reasonable.86  However, 
some states explicitly provide that notification is required even if 
a covered entity determines that there is no reasonable risk of 
harm.87  For example, California, the first state to enact a data 
breach notification statute, requires notification in the event of 
any unauthorized acquisition of data.88 
D. Penalties 
Finally, states are split as to whether a private right of 
action exists in the event of a data breach.  The majority of states 
have decided that an individual should not have a private right of 
action.  However, states such as Hawaii, Louisiana, and Nevada 
are exceptions.89  Most states simply allow the state attorney 
general to bring an action on behalf of affected consumers.90  
There are very few states that provide for criminal penalties in 
the event of a violation of their statutes; for example, Michigan 
makes it a misdemeanor to notify consumers that a breach 
occurred when it did not.91  Through criminal penalties, the 
DSBNA provides a strong incentive to comply that is absent from 
most state laws. 
III. A HYBRID OF STATE LAW AND THE DATA SECURITY AND 
BREACH NOTIFICATION ACT 
The diversity among the state data security laws is confusing 
and increases compliance costs for corporations.  A unified 
federal standard has the potential not only to make it easier for 
entities to comply with statutory requirements, but also to 
increase consumer protection in the wake of a steady stream of 
cyber threats.  However, the DSBNA, as written, is unable to  
 
 
86 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(c) (McKinney 2018) (The criteria are 
“(1) indications that the information is in the physical possession and control of an 
unauthorized person, such as a lost or stolen computer or other device containing 
information; or (2) indications that the information has been downloaded or copied; 
or (3) indications that the information was used by an unauthorized person, such as 
fraudulent accounts opened or instances of identity theft reported.”). 
87 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2018). 
88 Id.; see Tom, supra note 45, at 1577. 
89 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487N-3(b) (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:3075 
(2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.270 (West 2017) (applies only to data collectors, 
not consumers). 
90 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-552(L) (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51-107 
(West 2018). 
91 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.72(12)(12) (West 2018). 
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fulfill these goals for a variety of reasons.  Instead, a model 
federal standard that adopts portions of both the DSBNA and 
current state laws would be more effective.   
Five points are necessary to a successful federal statute.  
First, the statute must include a preemption provision that 
increases the strength of protections in jurisdictions with the 
weakest laws without diluting the protections in jurisdictions 
whose statutes are more consumer-oriented.  Second, a federal 
standard must include a private right of action as a necessary 
remedy for individuals to assert and protect their rights, and to 
incentivize entities to enact strong security policies while 
complying with strict notification requirements.  Third, entities 
should be required to notify individuals without unreasonable 
delay, as this standard allows for flexibility without posing 
danger to consumers from undue delay.  Fourth, consumers 
should be notified in the event of any breach, without exceptions 
for a reasonable risk of harm analysis.  Lastly, a federal standard 
should include incentives for covered entities to maintain 
cybersecurity insurance as both a protection for themselves as 
well as for consumers by extension. 
A. A Model Federal Data Security and Breach Notification 
Statute Must Contain a Narrower Preemption Provision  
than the DSBNA 
Even though a unified federal standard is desirable, the 
preemption language of the DSBNA actually weakens consumer 
protection for the sake of that unity.  The DSBNA would preempt 
current state data breach notification laws in several different 
areas.92  Currently, some state statutes already offer stronger 
data privacy protection and notification than would be provided 
for in the DSBNA.  Those protections should not be preempted, 
and any federal standard should find a way to accommodate 
those adequate safeguards. 
As a result of the diversity of data breach notification 
statutes across the country, many businesses that operate 
interstate tend to follow certain aspects of the strictest state laws 
 
92 Bailin, supra note 44 (The Act “contains a preemption provision to ensure the 
bill will ‘supersede any provision of the law of any State, or political subdivision 
thereof, relating to notification by a business entity engaged in interstate commerce 
of a security breach of computerized data.’ ”). 
992 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:977   
for the sake of simplicity.93  This means that many consumers 
have been protected by the requirements of the strictest state 
breach notification statutes in the country for certain aspects of 
data notification law.  However, even though this has led to a 
partial and informal unity in an otherwise chaotic area of law, it 
is far less reliable than the consistent, statutorily required unity 
that would result from a federal statute.  Further, whatever that 
federal standard turns out to be, if it preempts the strictest state 
statutes and imposes a less demanding standard, it will weaken 
some of the protections that consumers have enjoyed.94 
If the DSBNA were the enacted federal standard, there are 
several categories of personal information protected in state 
statutes that would be preempted.  For example, an industry has 
emerged around the collection and handling of consumers’ health 
and fitness data through websites, apps, and wearable devices.95  
This type of information is not covered by the definition of 
personal information in the DSBNA, and any state law providing 
notification requirements for a breach of this category of data 
would no longer be in effect.96  A few state laws even still include 
information in paper or other analog formats within their 
definitions of personal data.97 
Some advocates have also warned that the preemption 
language of the DSBNA could prevent local governments from 
developing non-breach related data security rules.98  It has been 
further suggested that, while the DSBNA itself does not propose 
preempting data breach regulations put in place by the Federal 
Communications Provision, the broad language in its preemption 
provision suggests that other bills that make their way to 
Congress might.99  Interstate corporations trying to manage their 
 
93 G.S. Hans, White House Data Breach Legislation Must Be Augmented To 
Improve Consumer Protection, CDT (Jan. 16, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog/white-house-
data-breach-legislation-must-be-augmented-to-improve-consumer-protection/. 
94 Other aspects of this Note’s proposed federal standard, such as a private right 
of action, can only be imposed uniformly on all states if included in a federal bill. A 
corporation’s own selfish interest to reduce compliance costs would not offer such 
protections. 
95 Bailin, supra note 44. 
96 Letter from Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. et al. to John Thune, Chairman, 
Senate Commerce Comm. & Bill Nelson, Ranking Member, Senate Commerce 
Comm. (Feb. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Letter from Ctr. for Democracy & Tech.], 
https://cdt.org/files/2015/02/letter-senate-commerce.pdf. 
97 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 1 (West 2018). 
98 Letter from Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., supra note 96. 
99 Id. 
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compliance costs need clarity on what combinations of illegally 
acquired data amount to a breach triggering notification.  
However, preempting entire categories of data that states 
explicitly chose to include in their legislation sacrifices the 
interests of consumers for the interests of large-scale 
sophisticated businesses.  These businesses willfully assumed the 
responsibility of safely storing that information, and their 
interests should not be put ahead of the interests of consumers. 
Amending the definition of personal data in the DSBNA to 
reflect the broadest definition in a state statute, thereby 
including health and medical data, analog formats, etc. would 
extend notification requirements and the increased protection 
those requirements provide.  But that approach, while helpful, is 
not a long-term or comprehensive solution.  Our perceptions of 
what constitutes personal data can change, as can hackers’ 
ability to exploit pieces of information for their benefit.  It would 
be more efficient and require less piecemeal post-hoc amending of 
the federal statute if it contained a modified preemption 
provision that does not negate the enforceability of state statutes 
that contain stricter provisions or broader definitions affording 
greater consumer protection.  A preemption provision structured 
as such also allows states to expand protection for their 
constituents as technology evolves, without forcing consumers to 
wait for the glacially paced federal legislature to address new 
issues. 
One possible way to structure a federal preemption statute is 
to ensure that it only preempts state laws that address the same 
areas that the federal law does.  The preemption clause could 
also be “further narrowed to resemble the preemption standard 
under” a federal statutory scheme such as HITECH, “which 
creates a floor for data protection, rather than a ceiling.”100  
Creating a floor would allow states to provide the strictest 
protection that their respective legislatures believe is necessary 
to protect their constituencies, while a unified floor would make 
it somewhat easier for interstate corporations to comply.  
Admittedly, this floor should resemble some of the highest 
protections currently created in state statutes.  Interstate 
entities would likely still have to tailor their practices to the 
strictest protections provided for in the states in which they 
operate as they currently do, but only in those states.  Many 
 
100 Hans, supra note 93. 
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intrastate entities would now be required to comply with 
notification requirements stricter than those they have dealt 
with in the past. 
Unlike the DSBNA, state laws can contain specific security 
standards or practices that entities must comply with, whereas 
the DSBNA tasks the FTC with creating and promulgating those 
specific regulations.101  Again, a broad preemption provision 
would overrule these specific state requirements and entities 
would only have to comply with the procedures promulgated by 
the FTC.102  The effect this would have depends in large part on 
what the FTC decides to do.  At the very least, states should be 
allowed to prescribe stricter procedures and policies for 
corporations to follow for the protection of their residents’ data. 
B. A Private Right of Action Should Be Included 
Another necessary aspect of a model federal standard is a 
private right of action.  Some state laws already provide for a 
private right of action.  A federal standard that preempts these 
would eliminate a protection already in place for individuals in 
those jurisdictions.103  After Sony’s online network was breached, 
it faced fifty-five different class actions alleging negligence and 
breach of privacy.104  Sony decided to settle at least several of 
these class actions.105  This is just one example of how consumers 
may rely on private rights of action to protect or vindicate their 
interests in the event of a large-scale breach of private 
information.  A private right of action should be available to the 
individuals residing in all states and territories; this can only be 
achieved through federal legislation. 
Currently, circuit courts are split regarding what constitutes 
standing in a data breach lawsuit.106  In Pisciotta v. Old National 
Bancorp, class action plaintiffs sought damages for the costs of 
 
101 Letter from Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., supra note 96. 
102 Id. 
103 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 28-3853(a) (West 2018); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 487N-3(b) (West 2018). 
104 Lance Bonner, Cyber Risk: How the 2011 Sony Data Breach and the Need for 
Cyber Risk Insurance Policies Should Direct the Federal Response to Rising Data 
Breaches, 40 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 257, 261 n.30 (2012). 
105 Anne Bucher, Sony Cyberattack Class Action Settlement, TOP CLASS ACTIONS 
(Feb. 26, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/closed-
settlements/329121-sony-cyberattack-class-action-settlement/. 
106 Kevin M. LaCroix, Deepening Circuit Split on Data Breach Suit Standing, 
THE D&O DIARY (Aug. 6, 2017), http://www.dandodiary.com/2017/08/articles/cyber-
liability/deepening-circuit-split-data-breach-suit-standing/. 
2018] PROTECTING PERSONAL DATA 995 
credit-monitoring services as well as negligence for a breach of 
their personal information.107  The Seventh Circuit held that 
“[w]ithout more than allegations of increased risk of future 
identity theft, the plaintiffs have not suffered a harm that the 
law is prepared to remedy.”108  Even though the applicable 
Indiana law provided for a private right of action, the court 
determined that it was not intended for individuals to recover on 
such a theory.109  However, in the D.C. Circuit, when insured 
persons brought a class action against a health insurer after 
their personal information was stolen during a data breach, the 
court held that the plaintiffs did indeed have standing.110 
Some might argue that a private right of action does not 
need to be included in a federal standard because any preemption 
provisions, similar to the one proposed in the DSBNA, do not 
preempt common law rights of action.  However, it is still unclear 
if individuals even have common law remedies for pursuing 
individual litigation due to this standing issue.  Including a 
private right of action when entities fail to comply with 
notification requirements provides a remedy for individuals who 
face costs when their personal data is exposed.  Some argue that 
a future risk of identity theft is not a cognizable injury and does 
not provide an individual the right to recover.  However, that 
response ignores the reality consumers face and does nothing to 
help consumers who are exposed to greater financial risk because 
an entity failed to comply with notification requirements.  It 
gives consumers two poor options.  First, they can unfairly 
assume the costs of preemptive measures themselves.  Second, 
they can wait until the risk of identity theft has been actualized 
to bring suit and suffer enduring and sometimes catastrophic 
consequences. 
Including a private right of action would encourage entities 
to implement extensive cyber risk related security policies.111  
Private rights of action are “an important incentive to companies 
to ensure that personal data sets are protected.”112  In an action 
brought pursuant to a private right of action for failure to notify, 
“plaintiffs [would be] required to show more likely than not that 
 
107 Bonner, supra note 104, at 267. 
108 Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2007). 
109 Id. at 639–40. 
110 Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
111 See infra Part III.E. 
112 Hans, supra note 93. 
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the breach—the failure to notify—caused the plaintiff’s injuries,” 
which would “place[] an extremely heavy burden on the 
plaintiff.”113  Allowing individuals to bring suit simply for the 
failure to notify, without actual identity theft, gives persons a 
means to obtain the funds necessary to protect themselves from 
the potential future injury, a relatively small amount of money 
for a large corporation.  In the event that an individual is 
actually injured, the high burden placed on the individual would 
limit the liability corporations face from individuals for their 
failure to comply.114 Corporations would only pay large damages 
if their negligence truly resulted in large injuries to these 
individuals.  This would prevent the combination of statutorily 
imposed penalties and individual damages awards from resulting 
in excessive liability for a single breach.  Under the proposed 
standard, plaintiffs would only be able to successfully plead their 
case where there is sufficient evidence that an entity’s non-
compliance played a substantial role in the ensuing injury. 
However, civil penalties in a federal data breach notification 
law should be uncapped.  The DSBNA imposes no upper limit on 
how much an entity can be assessed for multiple security 
breaches and imposes a harsh penalty on entities that willfully or 
intentionally fail to comply with its requirements.115  On the one 
hand, this could lead to incredibly substantial liability for 
corporations stemming from a single data breach.  However, this 
additional penalty is only imposed for willful failure to comply 
with the notification requirements, not for the injuries sustained 
by individuals resulting from a breach.116  Harsh penalties 
without any upper limit provide a strong incentive for covered 
entities to comply.  As such, uncapped civil penalties, as provided 
for in the DSBNA, should be included in a model federal 
standard. 
A federal standard must also make it clear that when the 
government collects civil penalties on behalf of his residents, the 
residents receive the reimbursement.  If individuals are not 
reimbursed when an action is brought on their behalf, they either 
receive no remedy for the breach or are forced to bring another 
action for the same breach themselves.  While damages provide a  
 
 
113 See Tom, supra note 45, at 1588. 
114 See id. 
115 S. 177, 114th Cong. § 5(e)(2)(B) (2015). 
116 Id. 
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strong incentive for entities to comply with the law after a 
breach, they do not make consumers whole again unless the 
funds end up in the pockets of affected individuals. 
C. The Standard of Notification Without Unreasonable Delay Is 
the Better Standard 
A federal law should provide that when notification is 
triggered, entities must notify individuals without unreasonable 
delay.  The DSBNA and a minority of states require that 
notification be given to individuals without unreasonable delay 
but with an upper limit.117  This alternative is not the best 
solution.  Capping how long entities have to notify individuals 
would likely incentivize them to notify individuals quicker than 
they otherwise would.  But, bright line rules are inflexible.  A 
federal statute should require entities to notify individuals in the 
most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, 
similar to most state statutes.118  Additionally, an upper limit 
may do more harm than good.  There may be situations where an 
entity has the means to notify individuals in much less time than 
the commonly required thirty days.  Including an upper limit on 
what can be considered “without undue delay” can actually give 
entities a “cushion to delay notification[].”119  Some businesses 
argue that thirty days is too short of a window to assess the 
extent of and respond to a data breach.120  In that event, when 
that claim is true and stands up to scrutiny from federal 
agencies, a more flexible window would allow entities to delay 
notification until it would be more proper.  As long as it is 
objectively reasonable that the entities take that much time, it 
would be fairer to allow them to do so.  The uncapped standard 
provides flexibility to deal with the exigencies of each 
individualized situation and is the preferable standard for a 
federal data breach notification law. 
 
117 Id. § 3(c)(1)–(2) (requiring notification be given no longer than thirty days 
after the discovery of a breach). See discussion supra Part II.B. 
118 See supra Part II.B. 
119 Bailin, supra note 44. 
120 Rachael King, 30 Days Not Enough Time in Obama’s Proposed Breach 
Notification Law: Retail Group, WALL ST. J.: CIO J. (Jan. 12, 2015, 6:00 PM), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/01/12/30-days-not-enough-time-in-obamas-proposed-
breach-notification-law-retail-group/. 
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D. The Reasonable Risk of Harm Analysis 
A federal law should not include a reasonable risk of harm 
exemption from notification requirements.  The exemption may 
help corporations whose data has been breached avoid greater 
costs, but it ignores the rights of individuals to know when their 
data has been accessed.  If an individual wants to preemptively 
take steps to avoid potential identity theft, it is vital that they 
know when their personal data has been accessed.  “[A] consumer 
can only have control over his personal information if he knows 
who is in possession of it; therefore, increased control requires 
increased disclosure.”121  The idea that individuals have 
ownership of their personal data, even after placing it in the 
hands of entities, is expanding and strengthening.122  Even if 
there is no substantial risk of harm, the risk an individual is 
subjected to after their personal data has been compromised is 
never fully mitigated.  A person should have the opportunity to 
take steps to protect themselves, even if they are being overly 
cautious.  Additionally, placing an unfettered notification 
requirement on covered entities provides them with still greater 
incentive to protect personal data above and beyond that 
provided by strict penalties.  Entities will want to avoid the 
reputational harm that would result from frequent data breach 
disclosures.  At the very least, individuals deserve to know what 
is happening with their data, something that ultimately belongs 
to them and them alone. 
It should be noted that the “risk of harm analysis may keep 
some companies from having to undertake costly notice 
requirements, [but] this may not be fiscally responsible for a 
covered entity.”123  If a breach becomes public after an entity 
determines that notice is not required, “a determination that the 
notification requirement was not met could end up costing huge 
amounts of resources in litigation costs, not to mention the 
negative publicity that may harm business interests, irrespective  
 
 
 
121 Tom, supra note 45, at 1593. 
122 Greg Otto, Why GDPR Is Flipping the Thought Process Around Data 
Ownership, CYBERSCOOP (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.cyberscoop.com/gdpr-podcast-
thomas-fischer-data-security/. 
123 Kelly M. Jolley & Lindy L. Gunderson, Data Breach Liability and 
Notification: What Do You Need To Know?, S.C. LAW., Nov. 2015, at 44, 48. 
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of legal requirements.”124  As such, there are instances where a 
reasonable risk of harm analysis works against the best interests 
of an entity under a compliance cost analysis. 
E. Cyber Risk-Related Insurance Should Be Encouraged in a 
Model Federal Statute 
Cyber risk-related insurance would make it easier for 
entities whose data has been breached to compensate affected 
individuals.  A model federal standard should include provisions 
that strongly encourage covered entities to maintain such 
policies.  When Sony was hacked and the financial data for 
millions of consumers was stolen, Sony’s potential liability was in 
the tens of billions of dollars.125  Unfortunately for Sony, its 
insurer claimed that Sony’s insurance policy did not cover cyber-
related third party claims.126  Costs resulting from a data breach 
can include investigating and repairing damages, notifying 
individuals and state agencies of the occurrence—as would be 
mandated by this Note’s proposed standard—and managing 
public relations and reputational harm.127  It is imperative that 
the entities covered by the proposed federal standard pursue 
cyber risk-related insurance policies, “which have become 
increasingly available over the past decade.”128 
One commentator notes that a way that the federal 
government can encourage companies to obtain cyber risk 
insurance is to mandate that government contractors and sub-
contractors maintain such policies.129  Doing so “might indirectly 
influence more businesses in the private industry to follow their 
competitors’ lead.”130  Also, if a model statute included a private 
right of action to bring suit against entities whose data was 
breached, it would encourage companies to seek cyber risk 
insurance to protect themselves from potentially massive 
liability.  “Cyber policies themselves impose requirements on 
businesses that must be met to ensure coverage, which can also 
help protect from a breach occurring in the first place.”131  
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125 Bonner, supra note 104, at 261. 
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129 Id. at 277. 
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Without maintaining insurance, the costs of statutory penalties, 
private rights of action, and practical costs for dealing with a 
breach could become debilitating.  This would not be beneficial 
for the economy or consumers.  Consumers still want to use the 
services provided by these entities; they just want to be able to do 
so without subjecting themselves to a substantial risk of identity 
theft. 
CONCLUSION 
The Data Security and Breach Notification Act is 
comprehensive legislation that expands the scope of protection 
under state law in many areas.  However, its broad preemption 
provision dilutes protections that consumers have grown 
accustomed to through state laws, far too extensively to be 
enacted as is.  A model federal standard must contain a modified 
preemption provision that allows states the flexibility to 
maintain their own, more stringent standards and to adapt them 
as they see fit.  The standard must also provide a private right of 
action because class actions act as an important mechanism for 
redressing individual wrongs, providing financial incentive to 
covered entities to adequately protect consumer data, and 
encouraging entities to enthusiastically comply with notification 
requirements to avoid both statutory penalties and litigation 
damages.  There is no indication that the number of cyber attack-
related data breaches is going to decrease anytime soon.  The 
federal law proposed in this Note is the best way to create some 
semblance of unity in this field while increasing protection for 
consumers and maintaining state autonomy to legislate in this 
area. 
